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Redefining Energy Security
“Energy security” is usually defined as the guarantee of  a stable and reli-
able supply of  energy at reasonable prices. However, this definition is often 
misleading because it equates oil supply as the primary focus of  a country’s 
energy security considerations. As a developing country with a limited natural 
resource endowment China does not rely on oil alone. Instead China is one 
of  the few economies in the world that still uses coal as one of  its main 
sources of  energy. Therefore, energy security in China is more comprehensive 
because it must consider the supply of  coal, gas, electricity and nuclear energy 
along with oil imports.
In addition to resource supplies, a country’s energy security also depends 
on a number of  domestic and international factors. Energy prices and the 
circumstances of  the international energy market are important external 
elements. The degree of  an economy’s dependence on energy, a country’s 
contingency capacity including strategic reserves, standby production capacity 
alternatives for energy substitution, energy efficiency and technical capacity 
are all key domestic considerations for a nation’s energy security. In these 
broad terms, China’s energy security is unquestionably more fragile than many 
developed countries. Consider the basic fact that in China, the maintenance 
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Table 1   China’s Energy and Key Economic Indices2
Year-end population (millions)
GDP (billions of  U.S. dollars)
Primary energy consumption
(million tons coal equivalent)
Power output (trillion watts)
Net oil import volume (million tons)
Per capita GDP (U.S. dollar)
Per capita energy consumption
 (kilogram coal equivalent)
Steel output (million tons)
SO 2 emissions (million tons)
1990 2000 2005
1143.33
232
204
987.0
863
621.2
66.35
-23.46
14.95
1267.43
1118
886
1385.5
1093
1355.6
128.50
74.00
19.95
1307.56
2279
1743
2224.7
1701
2474.7
352.39
143.61
25.49
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of  social and economic development requires higher energy intensity than 
in developed nations. End-user expenditure on energy in China accounts for 
15.7 percent of  GDP, while the figure is only 7 percent in the United States.1 
Reducing both the direct and indirect (externalities) expenses of  China’s en-
ergy mix can only come from serious conservation measures. 
Energy conservation is the most realistic and economical approach for 
China to achieve a viable energy security. Research shows that the net costs of  
wind energy, hydropower and nuclear power as programs for reducing fossil 
fuel use and corresponding CO2 emissions are 6.1, 6.2 and 7.0 times more 
than energy conservation.3  There is huge potential to make large efficiency 
gains using energy conservation and therefore it must be the priority of  an 
energy security strategy. In the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010), the Chinese 
government has committed to bring the country’s overall energy intensity 
down by 20 percent.4  This would effectively make it the most ambitious 
energy conservation program in the world. As energy conservation is vital to 
China’s energy security, it is important to understand how the government is 
faring in achieving its goals and whether these goals are indeed realistic.
The Inevitability of  Demand
Much ink has been spilt over analyzing the nature of  China’s economy and 
how it will be fueled in the future. There is little doubt that China’s demand 
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for energy will rapidly increase in the foreseeable future. 5 Yet, understanding 
the structure of  its energy consumption patterns is crucial in order to create 
effective policy prescriptions to improve energy efficiency and to promote 
conservation. Structural changes in industrial production have been the pri-
mary reason for China’s rapid increase in energy demand. Beginning in the 
early 1990s, China entered a new round of  heavy industrialization. Heavy 
industry comprised 66.5 percent of  China’s 
total industrial production value in 2004; 
up from a level of  50.6 percent in 1990. 6 
Notably, the energy consumption per unit 
of  production value (energy intensity) in 
heavy industry was four times higher than 
the intensity for light industries.
The reason for this fundamental shift 
lies primarily in the rapid acceleration of  
urbanization throughout the country and 
the attendant changes in people’s consumption patterns. The rate of  popula-
tion migration from the rural areas to the cities is unprecedented in human 
history. From 1978 to 2004, China’s urbanization rate rose from 17.9 percent 
to 41.8 percent, increasing the total urban population from 170 million to 540 
million. 7 Equally staggering is that the current per capita energy consumption 
in China’s cities is three and a half  times more than in the countryside (a 
disparity that is far higher than in developed countries).8  Compared to their 
rural counterparts, urban dwellers demand more living space, more automo-
biles and more home appliances, all of  which entail highly energy-intensive 
industries.
In addition, China is expending an enormous amount of  energy in its role 
as “factory of  the world.” China produces one-third of  the world’s computers 
and refrigerators, one-half  of  its textiles, digital cameras and DVDs, and 60 
percent of  the air conditioners, microwave ovens and copy machines bought 
around the globe. The huge demand in the domestic and international market 
for Chinese goods drives the rapid growth in the output of  products requir-
ing high energy-consuming industries. The benefits of  becoming the world’s 
primary manufacturer are offset by the costs of  the staggering consumption 
of  both energy and other commodity resources. In 2003, China burned up 
32 percent of  the global aggregate coal output, 26 percent of  global steel 
The structural change in 
China’s energy demand 
lies primarily in the rapid 
acceleration of  urbanization 
and people’s consumption 
patterns.
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output, 25 percent of  its copper and aluminum and 40 percent of  the world’s 
cement.9 
Looking to the future, as urbanization and the structural upgrading of  
consumption look set to continue for a very long time, China’s output of  high 
energy-intensive products will only continue to grow. As a result, a vast rise 
in China’s demand for energy will simply be unavoidable. Several forecasts 
predict that by 2020 China’s primary energy demand will be between 3,300 
and 3,700Mtce or between 1.5 and 1.7 times its demand in 2005.10 
Energy Efficiency Floundering11
Since the reform and opening-up, China has actually made great strides in 
energy conservation in an effort to address escalating consumption. Between 
1980 and 2000, China’s annual GDP growth averaged 9.7 percent, while pri-
mary energy consumption grew by only 4.6 percent annually, giving an energy 
consumption elasticity coefficient of  0.47. Given the strains of  “middle in-
dustrialization” (period of  rising heavy industry in economy), this is actually a 
remarkable achievement. Yet, since 2002, China’s energy conservation rate has 
deteriorated. That is, energy demand has been increasing faster than China’s 
GDP growth, reversing the trend of  its declining energy intensity and leading 
to a jump in its energy consumption elasticity to 1.6 between the years 2003 
and 2004. While this may be a temporary abnormality, it could nevertheless be 
a signal that the role of  structural energy conservation is weakening.12 
In the first place, there is a phenomenal waste in China’s energy produc-
tion. The overall efficiency of  the energy sector stands at a mere 11 percent. 
In other words, only slightly more than a tenth of  the recoverable energy 
reserves are converted into end-usable energy, while almost 90 percent of  it is 
lost or wasted in exploitation, processing, conversion, transportation, storage 
and end utilization process. Such low efficiency of  the energy sector translates 
into higher energy end-product expenditures. For instance, the average cost 
of  China’s domestic oil refinery production was 30 percent higher than that 
of  their foreign competitors.13  
Secondly, energy efficiency in China remains very low despite the overall 
progress in conservation over the past decades. Currently, domestic energy 
intensity is about 50 percent higher than that of  other developing countries 
with similar conditions. China also continues to lag far behind advanced 
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country levels of  energy efficiency, especially within energy-intensive product 
industries. In 2004, coal consumption per unit in China’s fossil fuel power 
plants was 20.5 percent higher than developed country levels, for steel-mak-
ing it was 15.6 percent higher and for cement-making it was 23.3 percent 
higher.14  
In 2004, the average energy consumption index of  16 products within 
seven of  China’s industrial sectors (power, steel, non-ferrous metals, construc-
tion materials, petrochemical, chemical and light industries) was 40 percent 
higher than that of  the world’s advanced economies. This situation is due in 
large part to the low energy efficiency of  general-purpose equipment used in 
these industries. For instance, the average operational efficiency of  small and 
medium-sized electric motors in China is 87 percent, while the figure is 92 
percent in the United States; for coal-fired industrial boilers it is between 60 
and 65 percent in China, while the figure is over 75 percent abroad.15  
The energy efficiency of  buildings in China is also egregiously low. Surveys 
of  residential structures with heating in Beijing, Tianjin and northeast China 
reveal the average amount of  energy consumed per heating unit is 24.2 kgce/
m2, or 3.9 times that of  Germany, which has similar climate conditions.16 
As China’s rising middle class seeks to purchase more cars, fuel efficiency 
standards will significantly impact the country’s energy consumption patterns. 
But here too, China lags behind in fuel economy. Currently, the average oil 
consumption for all automobiles is more than 20 percent higher than devel-
oped nations, while for light trucks China’s is over 25 percent higher. 17 
 
Structural Potential
Energy conservation is simply the effort of  lowering energy intensity for 
any socially or economically productive activity. However, the range of  tools 
to improve conservation goals can include economic, technological, legal and 
administrative methods, as well as publicity and education, while their avail-
ability and effectiveness depend on the particular cultural, socio-economic 
and political conditions of  a nation.
Structural shifts in the economy are extremely important elements in en-
ergy conservation because they have both the potential to cause significant 
shifts in energy intensity and because there is an inherent incentive to imple-
ment structural improvements: energy costs and dependence on energy can 
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The energy intensity of  
China’s business sector is 
merely one-fifth of  the average 
of  heavy and light industries.
be alleviated. Structural factors entail the make up and scale of  the industrial 
sector, enterprises, as well as product composition, energy mix, and even the 
structure of  trade (import and export of  energy-intensive products).
Industrial structure adjustments in the economy mainly involve moving 
from heavy industry to higher technology and service sectors that require less 
energy intensive activity and have higher added-value. The energy intensity of  
China’s business sector is merely one-fifth of  the average of  heavy and light 
industries. Improving the structure of  economic production requires devel-
oping new energy-conserving, environment-friendly construction materials, 
high concentration fertilizers and the like. Adjusting energy structure means 
shifting domestic energy consumption from coal to higher efficiency energy 
such as electricity, gas and steam. All developing nations face these structural 
challenges and their implementation that, although vary in difficulty, are rela-
tively straightforward. 
Enterprise structure, however, is more unique to China. The evolution of  
China’s enterprises has been instrumental in leading the country during the 
early stages of  China’s rapid economic growth of  the past 20 years. In the 
initial stages of  reform, many small and medium sized enterprises sprang up 
in villages and townships around the country as they were more versatile and 
adaptive to taking advantage of  the rapidly 
changing policy and market environment of  
the moment. Many of  China’s energy-inten-
sive and highly polluting enterprises belong 
to this group of  smaller scale enterprises. 
Within the energy intensive industrial sec-
tor, small industries use 30 to 60 percent 
more energy per output than larger-scale 
enterprises.18 Unfortunately, the former produce the majority of  output of  
these energy-intensive items. Surveys show that smaller scale industrial en-
terprises account for some 50 percent of  the total energy consumption of  
China’s entire industrial sector.19 These enterprises continue to use backward 
production techniques and high energy-consuming raw materials, all of  which 
are exacerbated by their lower level of  technical equipment and management 
methods. For example, in 2004, the average annual pig iron (raw iron) output 
of  blast furnaces in China was 750,000 tons, while in Japan the figure was 
2.83 million tons. There are as many as 5,027 cement factories in China, with 
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Table 2   International Comparison of  the Enterprise or Facility in 
Energy Intensive Industry (2004)20
China Foreign
Cement Factories
Blast Furnaces
Refineries
Category
28,000 with average annual output 
of  70,000 tons
9 in Germany, average annual output 
of  5.56 million tons
Coal Mines
5,027 with an average annual 
output of  190,000 tons
56 with annual processing capacity 
of  4.19 million tons
263 with average annual steel 
production of  750,000 tons
65 in Japan, average annual output 
of  1.14 million tons
6 in South Korea, annual processing 
capacity of  21.47 million tons
29 in Japan, annual steel production 
of  2.83 million tons
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a mean annual output of  a mere 190,000 tons. By comparison, the figure 
is 1.14 million tons in Japan. The challenges in altering the production and 
energy consumption patterns of  these enterprises are formidable. Many of  
them have deep political and economic relationships with local governments 
and interests, making their behavior difficult to substantively change, let alone 
consolidate or close them down.
During the first two decades of  China’s rapid economic reform (1980-
2000), structural energy conservation accounted for approximately 70 percent 
of  total energy conservation.21 However, between 2003 and 2004, the energy 
conservation rate (rate of  decrease in energy intensity) has turned negative, 
a rather rare phenomenon. This is most likely due to the excessive growth in 
production of  energy-intensive industries such as steel, cement and aluminum, 
yet it holds the possibility that structural energy conservation is declining. 
This would be extremely unfortunate, since in the long run, there remains 
potential for huge gains in structural energy conservation.22  
Accelerating technological innovation clearly brings substantive drops in 
energy consumption per unit output. There are numerous examples of  China’s 
development in advanced science and technology. To name a few, China has 
independently designed and manufactured 600MW supercritical pressure 
units, 23 320kVA (kilo Volt-Ampere) roasters for aluminum processing, 24  and 
new high-volume pre-heaters for the cement-making process. In 2005, high-
efficiency electric light sources accounted for over 50 percent of  the total 
of  electric lighting.25  Yet, only 30 percent of  China’s energy conservation 
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achievements from 1980 to 2000 were the result of  technological progress 
illustrating - in stark relief  - how much room remains for these advances to 
achieve big leaps in China’s energy conservation.
The Policy Report Card
Research by the World Bank has shown that ‘market forces’ only contrib-
ute to approximately 20 percent of  energy conservation. 26 This is primarily 
because there are substantially more ‘market obstacles’ and fewer economic 
incentives to achieving permanent energy conservation gains than for instance, 
increasing energy supply through development projects. The latter is largely 
responsive to market mechanisms such as price, quantity and technological 
innovation. For energy conservation, on the other hand, the role of  the mar-
ket is constrained because markets and prices tend to represent short term 
profits but do not sufficiently reflect long term benefits and potential. As a 
result, energy conservation is generally unattractive, especially with investors 
only willing to make a minimum investment. In addition, the market fails at 
incorporating the impact of  environmental degradation in the cost of  energy 
consumption, thus negating an important incentive to changing consumption 
behavior and promoting conservation.   
The government is therefore essential to overcoming negative externali-
ties like environmental degradation and can do so through managing energy 
conservation such as using energy-efficiency standards, tax and funding 
incentives, energy audits, market regulation and research and development 
initiatives. However, this brings us to the one of  the biggest obstacles facing 
the promotion of  energy conservation: institutional weakness. Already more 
than 10 years ago, the government set out the guidelines on energy policy 
that put conservation on a par with resource development, even making the 
former a priority. Yet, it is clear this goal is far from being realized.27 
Agencies
While market-oriented reforms in China have pressed forward in the past 
decade, energy conservation work has noticeably retreated. The government 
administration for energy conservation has been losing a significant amount 
of  its personnel since 1992 and nearly all economic incentive policies arising 
from it have been abolished.28 With recent energy shortages, these institu-
Wang Qingyi
97China Security    Summer 2006
tional shortcomings are all the more glaring. In comparison with areas such as 
power and fossil fuels, the investment in energy conservation is anemic. Set 
alongside similar agencies in other market economies, there is an urgent need 
for reform of  this government body. Take the United States for example. 
In 2003, the Office of  Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy (under the 
Department of  Energy) had a staff  of  450 and a budget of  $1.3 billion. 
Japan’s equivalent bureau had 65 employees and a budget of  $400 million. 29 
China has only a handful of  people working on energy conservation with a 
fraction of  the budget. 30 
A case in point of  the negative effect of  administrative and regulatory 
inadequacy is the current status of  China’s Energy Conservation Law, pro-
mulgated in 1998. Approximate evaluation suggests that only 6 percent of  
its articles have been implemented sufficiently, 60 percent have been poorly 
implemented and 34 percent have not been implemented at all. 31 One article 
within that law covering energy conservation design standards for buildings 
has been adopted by roughly 15 to 20 percent of  new buildings in cities and 
towns in China. It is urgent that the Energy Conservation Bureau is rees-
tablished and the system of  an executive energy conservation meeting of  
the State Council resumed. Government officials at all levels should greatly 
strengthen their abilities in comprehensive decision-making, coordination and 
administration of  energy conservation.
Investment  
Reducing the growth of  energy consumption has been shown through 
research to be highly dependent on the amount of  investment put into energy 
conservation. In 1983, 13 percent of  total energy development investment 
went into energy conservation. That figure fell to 4 percent in 2003. Lowering 
energy consumption levels to half  of  GDP growth would take an estimated 
10 times the investment of  current levels.32 
Investment in technological innovation is probably the most important 
factor in altering energy conservation levels. In China, there are very few R&D 
funds available for energy conservation technology. Enterprises are usually 
the main source of  innovation, yet this remains small to non-existent in many 
sectors of  the economy. One survey conducted by the Ministry of  Science and 
Technology reveals not only is enterprise R&D funding in China far below 
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their developed economy counterparts, a mere 2 percent of  the latter’s total 
R&D funding went to energy conservation.33 In similar fashion, a negligible 
0.66 percent of  enterprise expenditures went to new product development.34 
Government R&D in energy conservation is equally deficient. It invested a 
total of  609 million RMB ($73 million USD) on energy R&D, with an estimated 
10 percent of  that going toward energy conservation. 35 This figure pales in 
comparison with others, such as the United States and Japan. They spent $557 
million and $559 million respectively on energy conservation, comprising 23.8 
percent and 15.7 percent of  their respective total energy R&D funding. 36 
The lack of  funding and policy oversight goes beyond economic con-
straints. It is an attitudinal issue as well. If  the government is to make any dent 
in energy conservation technology innovation, it must significantly increase 
funds for energy conservation R&D, guide and encourage enterprises to 
develop energy conservation technologies and promote the publication and 
dissemination of  research results.
Incentives  
China’s fiscal and tax reform of  1994 effectively undermined many of  
the incentives for the promotion of  energy conservation that were built 
into previous policies. 37 The adverse effect on conservation has been grave 
indeed. Government support is vitally important in overcoming the many 
obstacles to energy conservation that currently exist in all the processes of  
the product life-cycle and in all actors relevant to energy conservation. This 
government action comes mainly in the form of  financial and tax policy 
incentives and can be divided into several categories. The first category is 
comprised of  those policies that promote energy conservation by lowering 
its investment cost such as financial allocations, tax reductions or exemptions 
and preferential loans. Another group entails measures that increase the cost 
of  energy consumption, for example energy and environmental protection 
taxes. A third purview of  government action comes in strengthening market 
signals by managing prices that reflect an accounting of  various externalities. 
Taken together, these government tools are essential components for manag-
ing energy demand, implementing voluntary conservation agreements and 
energy audits of  companies and promoting energy efficiency standards.
One of  the most useful measures at the government’s disposal is a variety 
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Failing to Set an Example
If  a government has any role in being a model for energy conservation, 
then China’s is doing a poor job. Defined as all administrative institutions, 
enterprise activities, and social organizations that fall under the auspices 
of  the state, the Chinese government encompasses approximately 50 mil-
lion persons. This is a bureaucracy on a grand scale and, unfortunately, it 
also wastes energy on a grand scale.
In 2003, the government’s per capita use of  energy, and of  electricity in 
particular, was 7.6 and 10.9 times higher, respectively, than China’s urban 
per capita energy consumption. In the same year, energy consumption by 
the Chinese government was recorded at 63.35 million tons of  coal and 
91.1 billion watts of  energy, an amount that surpassed the total energy 
consumed by China’s 800 million rural population. These levels of  energy 
consumption are also far higher than other governments. In one com-
parison, for example, the government of  Australia’s New South Whales 
province is 2.3 times lower than that of  China’s.   
Rather than have society’s highest rate of  energy consumption, the 
government should strive to be a model for energy efficiency, or at the 
very least, no more wasteful than the citizens it governs. It has the means 
and responsibility to be an exemplar in the implementation and organiza-
tion of  energy efficiency and conservation policies as well as follow its 
own mandate of  purchasing energy efficient products and technologies. 
The Chinese government has yet to meet that challenge. 
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of  levies and/or exemptions that curb consumption of  fuel or encourage 
energy efficiency. The main goal of  highway transportation tax is both for 
energy conservation and environmental protection. A suitable level of  fuel 
oil tax plays an important role in oil conservation. In 2003, the U.S. gasoline 
fuel oil tax was only 11 percent of  the British rate, while the average daily oil 
consumption per person in the United States was 2.6 times that of  Britain.38 
The European Union levies vehicle tax by engine power and encourages 
consumers to buy small displacement cars. In 2005, to encourage the devel-
opment of  high-efficiency and clean automobiles, Japan lowered the vehicle 
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tax by 25 percent to 50 percent for new automobiles that meet fuel economy 
and emission standard targets set for 2010. For those who buy hybrid power 
or fully electric automobiles, the government offers subsidies as high as 50 
percent of  the price difference between these automobiles and conventional 
gasoline automobiles. 39
As a second example, energy pricing management is also a powerful 
instrument of  the government to promote energy conservation. The basis 
for improving energy efficiency in the economy remains using the price of  
energy to fully reflect the total cost of  energy; that is, allowing the supply 
and demand relationship to function properly. Under these conditions, energy 
price and energy conservation are directly linked: constant energy prices may 
lead to improvement in efficiency but will also lower energy expenses thereby 
increasing demand; on the other hand, a rise in energy price will reduce de-
mand and promote R&D of  energy conservation technology. 40
Energy efficiency can also be effectively enhanced using standards labeling. 
An example of  this activity is the ‘Energy Star’ label adopted by the U.S. 
government, which it supported with $35 million in 2001. 41  Expanding the 
market share of  energy-saving products through the lowering of  market bar-
riers is another method of  promoting energy efficiency. The governments 
of  40 different states and utility companies subsidized customers with $63 
million for purchases of  various home appliances. In California, a subsidy was 
implemented in the amount of  $75 to $125 per refrigerator, $50 per air condi-
tioner and $75 per washing machine, if  they met energy-saving standards.42 
Economic incentives can come from a 
variety of  sources including the government 
budget, energy companies, energy conser-
vation funds and international cooperation 
projects. Thailand has set up one of  the 
world’s largest energy conservation funds, 
totaling $5 billion, through various means 
including levies on oil products. 43 The fund 
promoted energy efficiency through label-
ing, demand side management and voluntary agreements. During the 1980s, 
China established several national energy conservation special funds, which 
offered preferential interest rates for technology innovation, but they were all 
abolished by 1998. 44 Currently, there is a dire lack of  government administra-
The basis for improving 
energy efficiency in the 
economy remains using the 
price of  energy to fully reflect 
the total cost of  energy.
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tion funds for energy conservation. Most of  the major conservation projects 
rely on international cooperation. While some international cooperation 
projects have achieved good results, they are not sustainable without robust 
domestic incentive policies.
Information 
Implementing effective energy conservation policies requires a compre-
hensive understanding of  China’s increasingly complex energy consumption 
patterns. This encompasses statistics and data coverage as well as accurate 
indexing, all of  which are particularly deficient at the present time. 
Other information regulation and services should be provided including 
public campaigns, information networks, education and consulting services. 
Guiding companies to execute voluntary energy audits have been highly ef-
fective in other countries and this practice should be aggressively adopted in 
China. Both the U.S. federal and state governments and the Japanese Ministry 
of  Economy, Trade and Industry provide small- and medium-sized enterprises 
with free energy audits. Through energy auditing, U.S. industrial enterprises 
have reduced their electricity consumption by 2 percent to 8 percent. Power 
companies provide energy audit services for energy conservation in residential 
houses, with an average energy conservation rate of  3 percent to 5 percent.45 
A Change of  Heart Needed
Energy conservation provides a crucial framework for understanding 
China’s energy security strategy.  In order for this to become a reality, how-
ever, a fundamental shift in how the nation perceives energy consumption 
and conservation is necessary. During the era of  the planned economy, energy 
conservation was thought of  as bridging the gap between energy supply 
and demand. Quota setting and price fixing were used to coerce people to 
conserve energy during shortages and thereby bring demand in line with sup-
ply. However, once those energy deficiencies were met and the crisis ended, 
conservation measures were relaxed, and previous consumption levels reap-
peared. The result was that following a period of  energy scarcity, a phase 
of  increased energy consumption was effectively causing a reversion to low 
energy efficiency.
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Although such policies act to curb demand-side behavior, they do not 
place the decision-making in the hands of  the consumer. Rather, the thinking 
underlying this planned economy strategy, much of  which still exists today, 
effectively puts the emphasis of  energy consumption levels and conservation 
on the supply and development of  energy. In other words, it stresses the need 
for increasing supply rather than decreasing consumption. The reasons for 
this are complex, but a key element is that as long as the monopolistic energy 
companies and the government have a deeply integrated relationship, the 
management of  energy supply will trump control of  energy demand. Such 
companies, focused on supply and development, will naturally have counter-
vailing interests to energy conservation and efficiency. 
Altering this reality will require a fundamental shift in attitude of  the 
government and its energy administration from predominantly pursuing 
supply quantity through energy exploitation and production to expediting 
conservation through economic and market mechanisms. The International 
Energy Agency states that, “the supply and demand relationship in the energy 
system is not determined primarily by energy supply, trade or energy markets 
but by end energy services.”  This transformation cannot be accomplished 
solely through technological, policy and institutional improvements, but also 
requires profound changes in people’s values. This is particularly relevant to 
China, whose consumption behavior has yet to catch up to the realities of  
China’s energy situation. Enforcing energy conservation would stir a revolu-
tion that will truly change the landscape of  China’s energy consumption and 
hence its energy security.
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